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MAXIMIZING PONZI LOSS DEDUCTIONS 
FOR ESTATE AND INCOME TAX PURPOSES: 




There is a long history of cases interpreting whether a theft 
loss deduction for securities fraud is allowable for personal income 
taxes. The cases require that for a theft loss to be actionable as such, 
it would have to meet the requirements of the common law defini-
tion of theft in the U.S. state in which it occurred. This generally 
requires direct privity between the person claiming the loss and 
the person who committed the theft. Because most securities trans-
actions are brokered, the direct privity is lost and a theft loss de-
duction is denied in favor a capital loss. Recently, in a case of 
first impression, the Tax Court was presented with a similar issue 
involving the worth of assets for estate taxes. Instead of using the 
reasoning presented in income tax cases, the Tax Court allowed a 
theft loss deduction on estate taxes where a Ponzi scheme was un-
covered while the estate owned a limited liability company. The 
sole assets of the company were shares of the security that was 
involved in the Ponzi scheme. This Article examines the history of 
the privity requirement for deducting a theft loss for income taxes 
and how that reasoning now differs from the tax treatment for 
estate taxes. The Article concludes that there should not be a differ-
ence in treatment and that direct privity should not be required 
for either income or estate taxes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A 2016 Tax Court case, Estate of James Heller v. Commis-
sioner,1 examined whether a fraud loss from a Ponzi scheme 
investment is theft loss for estate tax returns in a case of first 
impression. And, viewed through a lens of the common meaning 
of fraud being a theft, combined with some indications that the 
position for denying a theft loss deduction to individuals in some 
cases is softening, this appears to be a fair and reasonable result. 
For income taxes, however, defrauded Ponzi scheme victims gener-
ally cannot take a deduction for theft loss on individual income 
tax returns, unless they were in direct privity with the party 
selling the Ponzi scheme investment.2 Instead, for income tax 
purposes, fraud losses in the absence of privity are generally 
treated as capital losses, which are extinguished without carry-
over beyond the taxpayer’s final tax return.3 This leads to an 
anomalous conclusion that, for theft loss deduction purposes only, 
the taxpayer, James Heller (Heller), may have been better off 
dead when the fraud was discovered. 
This Article discusses the Heller case, Internal Revenue 
Code (Code) § 2054, and commonalities with case rulings and 
judicial comments where living individuals would also be allowed 
a theft loss after a fraud under Code § 165(c) and the impact of 
Heller on these.4 It then discusses the difference in financial effect 
for Heller had the court interpreted § 2054 in a manner consistent 
with § 165(c) and the history of the § 165(c) tax treatment. It con-
cludes with a recommendation in support of the Heller decision 
and in extending the court’s reasoning to similar § 165(c) cases 
where the taxpayer is still alive.5 
I.  THE HELLER CASE AND THEFT LOSS FOR ESTATE TAXES 
At the time of his death on January 31, 2008, Heller had a 
99 percent interest in the James Heller Family LLC (JHF), the 
                                                                                                            
1 Estate of James Heller v. Comm’r, 147 T.C. No. 11, at *1 (2016). 
2 See I.R.C. § 165(e) (Supp. II 2012); see also Adkins v. United States, 113 
Fed. Cl. 797, 804 (2013). 
3 I.R.C. § 165(g) (Supp. II 2012). 
4 See infra Part I. 
5 See infra Section II.B and Conclusion. 
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sole asset of which was an account with Madoff Securities.6 Each 
of Heller’s two children held a 0.5 percent interest, accounting 
for the remainder of the assets of JHF.7 From 1999 through 2007, 
Heller personally contributed $6,052,000 to the account and with-
drew $12,429,781.8 On December 19, 2006, the LLC contributed 
an additional $150,000 and on January 3, 2007, Heller transferred a 
balance shown of $14,850,000 from his personal account to JHF.9 
JHF withdrew $11,500,000 from the securities account and 
distributed 99 percent of this amount ($11,385,000) to the estate 
of James Heller (Estate), to pay its taxes and administrative 
expenses.10 On December 11, 2008, Bernard Madoff (Madoff), 
the head of the securities firm, was arrested for, and later pled 
guilty to, securities fraud.11 Madoff later admitted that Madoff 
Securities was a Ponzi scheme that was perpetuated by the fab-
rication of periodic account statements.12 After the revelation of 
the Ponzi scheme, the approximately $5,000,000 balance owned 
by JHF in the Madoff Securities fund, became worthless, thus 
making JHF worthless.13 The Estate claimed that balance as a 
theft loss deduction on a timely filed federal estate tax return.14 
The return showed a gross estate of $26,296,807, which included 
$16,560,990 as the value of Heller’s 99 percent stake in JHF, 
and claimed a $5,175,990 theft loss related to the Ponzi scheme.15 
The deduction was calculated as the value of the Estate’s interest 
in JHF as reported on the estate tax return minus the Estate’s 
share of the amounts withdrawn from the account.16 The IRS 
agreed that a fraud loss occurred but claimed that JHF was en-
titled to the theft loss, not the Estate.17 The IRS disallowed the 
deduction on the basis that a theft was not perpetrated against 
                                                                                                            
6 Heller, 147 T.C. No. 11 at *1. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. at *1 n.3. 
9 Id. 
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the Estate and issued a notice of deficiency to the Estate for the 
tax on that deduction.18 The Estate challenged that determina-
tion in tax court, moving for summary judgment.19 Based on its 
assertion that JHF incurred the theft loss, not the Estate, the 
IRS filed an opposing motion for partial summary judgment.20 
The sole issue in Heller was, given that JHF (which was 
99 percent owned by the taxpayer) was the owner of the fraudu-
lent account, whether the taxpayer was eligible for a theft loss 
deduction for the fraud loss suffered by the Estate as a result of 
the Ponzi scheme.21 While similar cases of whether a fraud loss 
is a theft loss exist for federal individual income taxes,22 the court 
noted that whether a fraud loss is a theft loss for estate tax pur-
poses under § 2054 was a case of first impression.23 
A.  The Estate Tax 
The estate tax is imposed on the taxable estate, which is 
the value of the net assets transferred to beneficiaries.24 The 
estate tax does not tax income from those assets or other work, 
although to the extent that the estate’s assets earn income in the 
period that the estate is open, that income may also be taxed.25 
Thus, the savings on income can essentially be taxed twice: once 
when earned as income, and again after what was saved is passed 
on to heirs.26 
The taxable estate is the value of the gross estate27 less 
allowable deductions,28 which include funeral expenses, adminis-
trative expenses of the estate, estate indebtedness, and taxes.29 




21 Id. at *1. 
22 See Vietzke v. Comm’r, 37 T.C. 504, 512 (1961); see also Jensen v. 
Comm’r, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 543, 546?47 (1993). 
23 Heller, 147 T.C. No. 11 at *2. 
24 I.R.C. § 2001 (2012). 
25 Id. 
26 Id. § 641. 
27 Id. § 2031(a). 
28 Id. § 2051. 
29 Id. § 2053(a). 
6 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:001 
Transfers to qualified charities30 and to one’s surviving spouse31 
are also deducted in arriving at the amount of the taxable estate. 
A unified credit is provided for all estates and lifetime taxable 
gifts, ensuring that small estates are not subject to the estate tax.32 
Currently, this credit translates to excluding the first $5,000,000 
of lifetime taxable gifts and estate value, indexed for inflation.33 
In arriving at the taxable estate, § 2054 also allows for 
deductions from the gross estate of “losses incurred during the 
settlement of estates arising from fires, storms, shipwrecks, or 
other casualties; or from theft, when such losses are not compen-
sated for by insurance or otherwise.”34 Using Black’s Law Dic-
tionary to define the term “loss,” the court in Heller found that “[i]n 
that context, a loss refers to a reduction of the value of property 
held by an estate.”35 
B.  Tax Court’s Ruling in Heller 
In summary judgment, the court upheld the theft loss de-
duction for the Estate under § 2054.36 The court’s reasoning was 
that, while the LLC incurred a loss of its sole asset due to fraud, 
the Estate also incurred a loss in the value of the gross estate 
because the fair market asset value of JHF declined.37 The court 
reasoned that again, based on plain meaning, a theft loss deduc-
tion is allowed provided that there is a sufficient nexus between 
the theft and the estate’s loss.38 The court opined that there was 
an undisputed and direct nexus between the theft and the value 
of the estate’s interest in JHF.39 To make its assertion, the court 
relied on White v. Commissioner.40 In White, the court found that 
                                                                                                            
30 Id. § 2055(a). 
31 Id. § 2056(a). 
32 Id. § 2010(c)(3)(A). 
33 Id. In the year of Heller’s death, the estate tax rules were different, but 
the size of the gross estate and the unified credit for that year were not in 
dispute. See Estate of James Heller v. Comm’r, 147 T.C. No. 11, at *2 (2016). 
34 I.R.C. § 2054 (2012) (emphasis added). 
35 Heller, 147 T.C. No. 11 at *2. 
36 Id. at *3. 
37 Id. at *2. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. (citing White v. Comm’r, 48 T.C. 430, 435 (1967)). 
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where an “other casualty” arose from41 direct and proximate dam-
age, similar to that of casualties specifically enumerated in 
§ 165(c)(3), the other casualty should receive casualty loss treat-
ment.42 Passing the stricter test of direct privity between the 
fraudster and the victim, as is commonly used for determining 
whether there is a deductible theft loss for income tax purposes, 
is not required.43 The court reasoned that the deduction was 
“consistent with the overall statutory scheme of the estate tax”44 
because the purpose of the estate tax is to impose a tax on “the 
net estate, which is really what of value passes from the dead to 
the living.”45 
II.  THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CAPITAL LOSS AND THEFT LOSS 
TREATMENT FOR INCOME TAXES 
As a case of first impression, Heller does not contradict 
existing regulations or legislative history pertaining to § 2054. 
This decision recognizes that there was, for estate tax purposes, 
a decline in the asset value of the estate arising from a theft or 
other casualty.46 Further, Heller does not directly contradict 
dissimilar rulings on what constitutes a theft for income tax 
purposes under § 165(c).47 However, because the language of the 
two Code sections48 is strikingly similar, the court could have 
used a line of cases interpreting § 165(c) as persuasive authority, 
which tends to eschew a plain reading of the statute. Instead, 
the court in Heller chose to do plain meaning analysis,49 leaving 
what can be interpreted as differing standards between what is 
a theft loss for estate purposes and for income tax purposes, 
                                                                                                            
41 White v. Comm’r, 48 T.C. 430, 435 (1967). The court further noted that the 
term “arising from” is a broad phrase that even encompasses casual connections. 
See United States v. Bradford, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1001, 1003 (N.D. Iowa 2006). 
42 White, 48 T.C. at 435. 
43 See, e.g., Taghadoss v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ. Op. 2008-44, at *3 (2008); 
Paine v. Comm’r, 63 T.C. 736, 737, 742?43 (1975). 
44 Heller, 147 T.C. No. 11 at *3. 
45 Id. (quoting Jacobs v. Comm’r, 34 B.T.A. 594, 597 (1936)). 
46 Heller, 147 T.C. No. 11 at *2–3. 
47 See Taghadoss, T.C. Summ. Op. 2008-44 at *3; see also Paine v. Comm’r, 
63 T.C. 736, 741 (1975). 
48 I.R.C. § 165(c) (2012); id. § 2054. 
49 Heller, 147 T.C. No. 11 at *2. 
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which could lead to confusion. Where a theft loss would be disal-
lowed for income tax purposes, the tax treatment of the loss 
would receive long-term capital loss treatment resulting from 
worthless securities.50 If that treatment were to be applied in 
Heller, the capital loss deduction would be limited to $3,000 in 
excess of capital gains,51 not $5,175,990 as claimed by the Estate. 
This difference in deduction amounts would be substantial for 
most families. 
A.  Capital Loss Treatment for Income Tax 
For individuals, capital losses offset capital gains on secu-
rities in the year of sale52 or when the security becomes totally 
worthless, where they are treated as being sold for zero dollars 
on the last day of the tax year.53 Where capital losses offset capi-
tal gains, the tax savings on those losses can be as high as 20 
percent plus Net Investment Income Tax at a rate of 3.8 percent.54 
Each year, the first $3,000 of capital losses in excess of capital 
gains, if any, offsets ordinary income at ordinary income tax 
rates,55 with the remaining capital losses being carried forward 
until the earlier of their exhaustion or individual’s final income 
tax return.56 Estates are also limited by the $3,000 per year con-
straint, but unused capital losses pass through to the heirs 
while maintaining their capital loss attributes.57 Consequently, 
a large loss net of capital gains can take many years, or worse, 
may never be recouped. 
B.  Theft Loss Treatment for Income Taxes 
The IRS and the courts traditionally rely on state law to 
define a theft, which bears little to no relation to the definition 
                                                                                                            
50 I.R.C. § 165(g) (Supp. II 2012). 
51 Id. § 1211(b). 
52 A decline in fair market value of securities held does not qualify as a de-
ductible capital loss (Treas. Reg. § 1.165-5(f) (2008)), except where a security 
becomes worthless. § 165(g). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. § 1411(a). 
55 Id. § 1211. 
56 Rev. Rul. 74-175, 1974-1 C.B. 52; see also I.R.C. § 1212(a)(1) (2012). 
57 Treas. Reg. § 1.642(h)-1 (2016). 
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of securities fraud used by the federal government. State laws 
differ, but most require direct privity or the intent to defraud on 
the part of the person taking a victim’s money.58 In Heller, had 
traditional state law reasoning been applied, it might be argued 
that Heller funded the Madoff account, and had the fraud been 
discovered while Heller owned the account, he could have taken 
a theft loss deduction on his individual income tax return.59 
However, Heller contributed that account to the formation of 
JHF, with no indication of economic loss, and therefore, no theft 
loss deduction at that time.60 JHF sustained the fraud loss when 
the Ponzi scheme was uncovered.61 JHF, however, would be inel-
igible for a theft loss under most state laws because there was 
not privity between JHF and Madoff.62 There was privity be-
tween JHF and Heller, but Heller did not intend to permanently 
deprive JHF of its assets.63 Further, since Heller was not the 
sole owner of JHF, JHF was a distinct entity, not a disregarded 
entity.64 Thus, the fraud loss of $5,175,990 would be treated as a 
long-term § 165(g) worthless security, capital loss until the estate 
is terminated, and then it would be passed to the beneficiaries, 
retaining its capital loss character.65 Were the two children the 
two heirs of the Estate, they would each receive a capital loss 
flow-through of $2,587,995 each. If the heirs had no other capital 
losses, they would take $3,000 per year through the earlier of 
their final federal individual tax return (due to their own death) 
or 862 years, with $1,995 taken in their 863rd year.66 Should they 
die first, the unused capital loss carryforward is lost permanently.67 
                                                                                                            
58 See Adkins v. United States, 113 Fed. Cl. 797, 804 (2013). 
59 See generally id. (hypothesizing that if the fraud was discovered while 
Heller owned and funded the Madoff account, privity would exist between 
Heller and Madoff, making a deduction proper). 
60 Estate of James Heller v. Comm’r, 147 T.C. No. 11, at *1 (2016). 
61 Id. at *2. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at *1. 
64 Id. 
65 I.R.C. § 165(g) (Supp. II 2012). 
66 You can deduct capital losses up to the amount of your capital gains 
plus $3,000. The carryforward would take 863 years because $2,587,995, 
divided by $3,000 per year, equals 862 years, plus the $1,995 in year 863. 
I.R.S. Instructions for Schedule D, Cat. No. 24331I (Oct. 19, 2016). 
67 Id. 
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1.  History of § 165(c)(3) 
 Section 165 of the Internal Revenue Code allows individ-
uals to deduct “any loss sustained during the taxable year and not 
compensated for by insurance or otherwise ...68 [that] shall be 
limited to ... losses of property not connected with a trade or 
business or a transaction entered into for profit, if such losses arise 
from fire, storm, shipwreck, or other casualty, or from theft.”69 
Theft is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary,70 but it is not defined 
in the Code. Courts have historically relied on state laws to define 
theft under Revenue Ruling 72-112.71 Edwards v. Bromberg72 
broadly defines theft loss as any criminal appropriation of an-
other’s property, including swindling, false pretenses or any other 
form of guile including blackmail, embezzlement and other frauds, 
extortion, kidnapping for ransom, larceny, robbery, and threats.73 
The laws of the location of the incident determine whether a tak-
ing is a theft. To be a theft, the taking must be illegal and done 
with criminal intent.74 Generally, the tax treatment of theft 
losses parallels that of casualty losses.75 Government seizures and 
confiscations, lost property,76 and reduction in the resale value 
of property77 are not thefts. 
Theft losses are deductible in the later of the year of dis-
covery or when there is no reasonable prospect of recovery.78 
                                                                                                            
68 I.R.C. § 165(a). 
69 Id. § 165(c)(3). 
70 The term “theft” means the fraudulent taking of personal property be-
longing to another, from his possession of some person holding the same from 
him, without his consent, with intent to deprive the owner of the value of the 
same, and to appropriate it to the use or benefit of the person taking. Theft, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 1477 (6th ed. 1990). 
71 Rev. Rul. 72-112, 1972-1 C.B. 60. 
72 Edwards v. Bromberg, 232 F.2d 107, 110 (5th Cir. 1956). 
73 Id. 
74 See Rev. Rul. 72-112 1972-1 C.B. 60 for U.S. theft losses requiring ap-
plication of state law. For foreign thefts, see First Chi. Corp. v. Comm’r, 69 
T.C.M. (CCH) 2089, 2097 (1995). 
75 See I.R.C. § 162 for losses on property used in a trade or business, § 212 
for income producing activities of individuals, and § 165(c)(3) for losses on 
personal use property. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.165-8(d) (as amended in 1964). 
76 See Powers v. Comm’r, 36 T.C. 1191, 1193 (1961). 
77 See Pulvers v. Comm’r, 407 F.2d 838, 839 (1967). 
78 See Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(d)(2)(i) (as amended in 1977); see also Geisler 
v. Comm’r, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 1734, 1736 (1988). The taxpayer has the burden 
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Where there is a reasonable prospect of recovery, the loss is sus-
tained in the year when one can reasonably determine whether 
a recovery will be received.79 A taxpayer must make reasonable 
efforts to recover stolen property and seek reimbursements from 
insurers.80 Each tax year that recovery is sought, the prospects 
for recovery must be re-evaluated, and, where prospects for re-
covery remain long enough, the statute of limitations for deduct-
ing a theft loss may actually bar recovery.81 Deduction can be 
denied where there is an unreasonable delay beyond the three-
year statute of limitations.82 Objective factors in determining 
the year of the theft loss include the existence of litigation of a 
claim and the availability of restitution.83 A subjective factor may 
be considered but cannot be the controlling or sole criterion.84 
Theft losses on investments are deductible at ordinary in-
come tax rates without regard to the 10 percent of adjusted gross 
income and the $100 per incident floors, provided taxpayers 
itemize deductions.85 Theft loss deductions are not subject to 
itemized deduction phase-out.86 
Relatively large theft losses can create a net operating 
loss (NOL),87 which is normally carried back to offset taxes paid 
                                                                                                            
of proof for what is “no reasonable prospect.” Gale v. Comm’r, 41 T.C. 269, 
276 (1963). 
79 Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(d)(3); see also Jeppsen v. Comm’r, 128 F.3d 1410, 
1414 (10th Cir. 1997). Such a recovery could come from an insurer, the Secu-
rities Investor Protection Corporation, or a net collectible amount of damages 
from court awards. See id. 
80 I.R.C. § 165(h)(4)(E) (Supp. II 2012). 
81 Woltman v. United States, 56 A.F.T.R.2d. (RIA) 5860, 5863 (S.D. Cal. 1985). 
82 Id. Woltman could have filed a formal disclaimer of any recovery in the 
year the theft was discovered, allowing him to claim the theft loss then. See 
Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(d)(2)(i). 
83 Huey v. Comm’r, 50 T.C.M. (CCH) 430, 434 (1985). Merely filing a proof 
of claim in bankruptcy and other ministerial acts, however, is not a strong 
indicator of recovery. Jensen v. Comm’r, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 543, 547 (1993); see 
Adkins v. United States, 113 Fed. Cl. 797, 807 (2013). All facts and circum-
stances must be considered. For example, in Schneider v. Comm’r, 49 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 1032, 1033?34 (1985), the taxpayer filed a lawsuit but the perpetrator 
had no assets from which to recover. The court found the lack of assets more 
persuasive than the presence of a lawsuit. Id. 
84 Adkins, 113 Fed. Cl. at 807. 
85 I.R.C. § 165(c)–(h) (Supp. II 2012). 
86 Id. § 68(c)(3). 
87 Id. § 172(d)(4)(c). 
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in the last two years and then carried forward for up to twenty 
years.88 However, to the extent that an NOL arises from theft 
losses, the carryback period is three years.89 An election can be 
made to forego NOL carryback.90 
Fraud may be treated as a nonbusiness bad debt which 
receives short-term capital loss treatment91 rather than as a theft, 
as in the case of Stoltz v. United States,92 where a taxpayer guar-
anteed a loan for a friend who misrepresented his ability to repay. 
Fraud losses may be split between capital losses and amending 
previous tax returns, as in the case of Kaplan v. United States,93 
where a couple invested in a Ponzi scheme, declaring fictitious 
income as reported on false statements before the fraud was dis-
covered.94 The initial investment was treated as capital loss, and 
the bogus income was corrected on previous returns where the 
statute of limitations had not yet barred.95 Fraud loss may be 
split between capital loss and theft loss96 where a company be-
gan to engage in fraud after having operated legitimately.97 In-
vestments made before the fraud received capital loss treatment 
and investments made after the fraud had started were treated 
as theft losses.98 
2.  Safe Harbor Provisions for Qualified Ponzi Scheme Victims 
Victims of a Ponzi scheme have relief available from Rev-
enue Ruling 2009-9, which allows victims to claim an estimated 
theft loss in the year of discovery without regard to whether a 
partial recovery might result.99 The amount of the theft loss is 
equal to the original basis plus previously declared dividend and 
capital gain income that was reinvested in the scheme, less money 
                                                                                                            
88 Id. § 172(b)(1)(A). 
89 Id. § 172(b)(1)(F). 
90 Id. § 172(b)(3). 
91 Id. § 166(d). 
92 Stoltz v. United States, 410 F. Supp. 2d 734, 739 (S.D. Ind. 2006). 
93 Kaplan v. United States, 100 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5674, 5678 (M.D. Fla. 2007). 
94 Id. at 5675 
95 Id. at 5682. 
96 I.R.S. Chief Couns. Mem. 200811016 (Mar. 14, 2008). 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Rev. Rul. 2009-9, 2009-14 I.R.B. 735. 
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recovered to date.100 No amendments of previous tax returns are 
required, eliminating the danger that the statute of limitations 
on the loss may bar before the potential for recovery is deter-
mined with reasonable certainty. 
A taxpayer qualifies for this relief if the taxpayer is a 
qualified investor who, unaware of the fraud, transferred funds 
to the “lead figure”101 who promoted a “specified fraudulent ar-
rangement”102 resulting in an investment loss. A fraud convic-
tion is not necessary, but the lead figure must be: (1) indicted for 
fraud, embezzlement or other theft loss; or (2) the subject of an 
ongoing state or federal criminal complaint where that com-
plaint: (a) alleged an admission by the lead figure; (b) the assets 
of the arrangement have been frozen; or (c) a receiver/trustee 
was appointed with respect to the assets of the fraudulent ar-
rangement.103 The taxpayer must otherwise be allowed a theft 
loss under § 165104 or Regulation 1.165-1105 and the fraudulent 
investment must not be a tax shelter.106 
Safe harbor relief only applies to Ponzi schemes where the 
lead figure: (1) receives property or cash from investors; (2) pur-
ports to earn investor income; (3) reports at least partially fictitious 
investor income; and (4) misappropriates some of the investors’ 
cash or property.107 No safe harbor relief is available for: (1) un-
paid loans from fraudsters to an investor; (2) investment fee 
deductions paid to the fraudsters; (3) undeclared fraudulent income; 
and (4) indirect investments in Ponzi schemes where cash or 
property was paid to a non-fraudulent fund or entity that in 
turn invested in the scheme.108 
Revenue Procedure 2009-20 provides that the taxpayer may 
deduct either 95 percent of the net investment loss where the tax-
payer agrees to pursue no recovery from a third party, or 75 percent 
                                                                                                            
100 Id. 
101 Claire H. Taylor, Helping Defrauded Investors Recoup Losses with the 
Tax Code: Advice for Litigators, 21 No.2 PIABA B.J. 225, 240 (2014). 
102 Id. at 240–41. 
103 Id. 
104 I.R.C. § 165(c) (Supp. II 2012). 
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of the net loss where the taxpayer intends to pursue recovery from 
a third party.109 However, specified third parties do not include: 
(1) the individual perpetrators of the fraud; (2) the investment 
vehicles or other entities that perpetrated the fraud, including its 
employees, officers, and directors; (3) a liquidation, receivership, 
bankruptcy, or similar estate established with respect to the 
individuals who perpetrated the fraud; and (4) parties subject to 
claims brought by a trustee, receivership, bankruptcy, or other 
estate described in (3) above.110 Actual and expected recoveries 
from third parties reduce the fraud loss, and recoveries in excess 
of the remaining 5 percent or 25 percent loss are declared as income 
in the year of recovery under the tax benefit rule.111 
3.  State Law Definition of Theft 
Relying on the precedent set by the 1956 Edwards case,112 
a taxpayer must generally establish that a theft has occurred as 
defined by state law to deduct a theft loss on a federal income tax 
return.113 In Edwards, the taxpayer gave a third party over $50,000 
to bet on a rigged horse race in Georgia.114 That third party em-
bezzled the money instead of betting it.115 The government argued 
that the taxpayer’s loss did not meet the definition of a theft under 
Georgia state law.116 The Fifth Circuit rejected the government’s 
argument, stating that the term “theft” should be construed 
broadly, covering “any criminal appropriation of another’s prop-
erty to the use of the taker, particularly including theft by swin-
dling, false pretenses, and any other form of guile”117 as interpreted 
under “the law of the jurisdiction where it was sustained.”118 
Many potential theft case rulings involve lengthy discussions 
about whether a theft met the state definition,119 but, other than 
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an axiomatic reliance on that one sentence from the Edwards 
ruling, they omit an explanation justifying why state law defini-
tions should be given higher weight than the federal definition 
of “theft.”120 
4.  Intent and Privity 
The IRS has been able to successfully argue under most 
state laws that the use of an intermediary, like a stockbroker, 
generally disqualifies the taxpayer from claiming the theft loss 
because there is no direct privity121 between the perpetrator and 
the victim. For example, in Taghadoss v. Commissioner, the tax-
payer purchased stock and exercised options through WorldCom’s 
employee stock purchase plan and 401(k), which while set up by 
WorldCom, was technically a different corporation than World-
Com itself.122 It was later discovered that WorldCom’s financial 
statements were fraudulent, and WorldCom filed for bankruptcy.123 
The taxpayer claimed a theft loss, reasoning that the false fi-
nancial statements from a related corporation amounted to a 
fraud, and thus a theft, against investors.124 The IRS denied 
Taghadoss’s theft loss deduction, arguing that while WorldCom 
executives committed fraud, Virginia law required privity, which 
the taxpayer did not have since he did not buy the stock directly 
from the corporation.125 In doing so, the court stated that “a cor-
poration is a taxable entity separate from its shareholders. Con-
sequently, shareholders generally cannot claim a deduction for a 
theft loss where the corporation itself was the victim of the 
theft.”126 Similarly, the court sided with the IRS, relying on 
Paine v. Commissioner.127 In Paine, the court reasoned that since 
the stock of a company was purchased from the open market, 
                                                                                                            
142 F.3d 651, 658 (3d Cir. 1998); Bellis v. Comm’r, 540 F.2d 448, 449 (9th Cir. 
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rights of property. Privity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 1199 (6th ed. 1990). 
122 Taghadoss v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ. Op. 2008-44, at *1 (2008). 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at *3. 
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the taxpayer lacked evidence that anyone intended to directly 
deceive him as required under state law.128 In Willey v. Commis-
sioner, a taxpayer loaned money to three corporations which 
invested that money in fraudulent trust funds.129 The corpora-
tions, as separate taxpayers, were allowed the theft loss, not the 
Willeys, who owned the corporations.130 Contrast these results to 
that of Vietzke v. Commissioner,131 in which a taxpayer purchased 
stock directly from the directors of the fraudulent corporation, 
where a loss may have been allowed because “a theft occurred 
both within the meaning of [state] law and of § 165(e) ....”132 A 
theft loss was also allowed in Jensen v. Commissioner,133 where 
the taxpayer was defrauded in a Ponzi scheme and the seller of 
the stock unknowingly acted as a feeder for the fraudulent com-
pany.134 While there was privity in this case, the court implied 
that it should not be necessary for “an investor [to] have direct 
contact with the entity in which he is investing. It is not un-
common for investors to deal only with their brokers and never 
have direct contact with their investments. In such cases, the 
brokers act as conduits for the investors’ funds.”135 
In Goeller v. United States, the Federal Claims Court opined 
that a narrow construction of whether a fraud is a theft loss 
solely under state law is “shibboleth,” and should be reconsid-
ered.136 In that case, California-based taxpayers had invested in 
an Ohio real estate company.137 When irregularities in the re-
porting of certain mortgages and properties arose, the taxpayers 
                                                                                                            
128 See id. at 741–42, 742 n.12. 
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filed amended tax returns claiming theft loss deductions.138 Both 
the IRS and the taxpayer cited state authority for the proposition 
of whether a “theft” had occurred, for purposes of § 165(c)(3).139 
However, they disputed whether the controlling law was that of 
Ohio or California.140 Rather than determine which state law 
was definitive, the court noted that for the other § 165(c) events 
(fire, storm, shipwreck, and casualty), the plain meaning of the 
terms determines whether there is a loss that is deductible.141 
Per Black’s Law Dictionary, the plain meaning of “fraud” is a 
crime in which one “obtains possession of property by lawful means 
and thereafter appropriates the property to the taker’s own 
use.”142 The court found no Congressional intent143 to support 
the sole reliance on state law144 but found a “plethora of Federal 
statutes that criminalized thefts; [including] various forms of 
larceny, embezzlement, fraud, and robbery; as well as money 
laundering, wire fraud, and other conduct associated with such 
crimes.”145 Further, most “courts have refused to make the opera-
tion of federal statutes referring to crimes dependent on a specific 
state’s law.”146 That is, reliance solely on state law definitions of 
fraud is, according to the court, “shibboleth.”147 Allowing for the 
use of a federal common law definition of theft for federal tax 
administration would also be equitable because “the victims of 
securities fraud crimes prosecuted under Federal law might not 
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qualify for deductions under § 165(c)(3) because their losses would 
not be viewed as resulting from thefts under state law.”148 
However, in Adkins v. United States,149 the plaintiffs suf-
fered an uncontested fraud loss that the IRS denied based on lack 
of privity.150 The taxpayer’s main contention was that the loss on 
securities was a fraud loss because, while the transactions in 
question were brokered, they were purchased on the advice of 
the fraudster. The judge ruled that “the perpetrator must have 
had the specific intent to deprive the victim of his property,” 
citing Goeller151 and noting: 
 
Most courts analyzing whether a particular criminal act consti-
tutes a theft for the purposes of I.R.C. § 165 refer to state law, 
but in a recent decision, the Honorable Francis M. Allegra of this 
court determined that the definition of theft should be derived 
from federal common law ... because plaintiffs purchased 
stock at the behest of one of [the fraudster’s] brokers ... third-
party brokers may have acted merely as conduits for plain-
tiffs’ funds. See Jensen v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 1993-393, 66 
T.C.M 543, 546 (1993) (noting that “[t]here is no requirement 
that an investor have direct contact with the entity in which 
he is investing”), aff’d, 72 F.3d 135 (9th Cir. 1995).152 
 
The judge noted that where the plaintiffs could demon-
strate that they purchased stock from brokers who were con-
trolled by the fraudsters, they may be able to establish privity.153 
However, where stock purchases were made solely on the advice 
of brokers, the judge ruled that there was no privity, granting 
the IRS’s request for summary judgment against taking a theft 
loss deduction.154 
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III.  ESTATE TAX AND INCOME TAX CODE SECTIONS NEED NOT 
BE INTERPRETED CONSISTENTLY 
The court was correct in asserting that Heller was a case 
of first impression and that no regulation or legislative history 
regarding § 2054 discusses whether an estate is entitled to a loss 
due to a theft that occurred during the settlement of an estate.155 
However, the opinion does not address why the court chose to 
have its analysis “begin[ ] and end[ ]with the statute.”156 When 
construing a statute in a case of first impression, a court does 
look to the language of the statute itself first and, secondly, to 
the legislative history.157 If there is no legislative intent to the 
contrary, the plain meaning of the words used controls.158 However, 
if the language of a statute is ambiguous, the court may resolve 
this ambiguity using secondary sources to interpret congressional 
intent.159 In cases involving administrative agencies, the statute’s 
administering agency provides an interpretation of congressional 
intent.160 If the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the 
specific issue, the court must decide whether the agency’s an-
swer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.161 
By having the analysis begin and end with the statute, 
the tax court is implicitly stating that § 2054 is unambiguous as 
to its meaning. Section 2054 reads, in relevant part, “the value 
of the taxable estate shall be determined by deducting from the 
value of the gross estate losses incurred during the settlement of 
estates arising from fires, storms, shipwrecks, or other casual-
ties; or from theft, when such losses are not compensated for by 
insurance or otherwise.”162 In Heller, the IRS argued Madoff 
Securities committed a fraud; it was perpetrated against JHF, 
not the Estate, and therefore, the Estate was not the victim of 
the fraud.163 JHF, even though owned mostly by the Estate, was 
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an entity separate from the Estate. In addition, as not being wholly 
owned by the Estate, it would not be considered a disregarded 
entity for tax purposes.164 This is important, because it is similar to 
another line of cases,165 such that if the court had found § 2054 
ambiguous in its plain reading, the court may have interpreted 
this case differently. 
Section 2054 is substantially similar in its structure to 
§ 165(c), which describes the casualty losses (including losses 
derived from theft) deduction for individuals.166 Section 165(c) 
allows for a deduction for “losses of property not connected with 
a trade or business or a transaction entered into for profit, if 
such losses arise from fire, storm, shipwreck, or other casualty, 
or from theft.”167 Both statutes permit that losses are deductible 
when they arise from theft. In Heller, the court noted that the 
term “loss” means “the disappearance or diminution of value.”168 
Although both sides agreed in Heller that there was a loss be-
cause JHF lost its sole asset in the Ponzi scheme, there was dis-
agreement between the parties regarding who actually incurred 
the loss.169 The IRS claimed that the loss belonged JHF, not the 
Estate, because under New York law, JHF, as an entity separate 
from the Estate, was the victim of the theft.170 The Estate claimed 
that it too was a victim, because the value of the Estate was di-
minished by the amount of money that was lost when the value 
of JHF fell in tandem with its sole asset, the investment in the 
Ponzi scheme.171 The court, again using a plain reading inter-
pretation, sided with the Estate by looking at the “arising from” 
language in § 2054.172 The court sided with the Estate and al-
lowed for a broad nexus between the theft and the incurred loss, 
stating that “‘arise’ is generally defined as ‘to originate from a 
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source.’”173 Further, the court stated “[t]he loss suffered by the 
estate relates directly to its JHF interest, the worthlessness of 
which arose from the theft.”174 
This plain reading interpretation of § 2054 is at odds with 
the interpretation of the similar provisions in § 165(c)(3).175 Starting 
with Edwards, most decisions on what constitutes a theft loss 
require that there must be a theft under the law of the state in 
which the theft occurred.176 In order for there to be a theft under 
state law, there must have been intent to deprive the person 
claiming the theft.177 Cases under § 165(c)(3) have consistently 
required that there be a direct nexus between the thief and the 
taxpayer in order to claim a theft loss deduction.178 In Edwards 
and its progeny, this nexus has been construed narrowly, requir-
ing direct privity between the thief and the victim.179 Any break in 
the privity, such as a brokered securities transaction, would dis-
allow the deduction based on theft.180 In Heller, the IRS suggests 
that the privity requirement under § 165(c)(3) should apply to 
§ 2054 by arguing that JHF incurred the loss instead of the Es-
tate.181 In Heller, the court, instead of requiring the nexus be-
tween the thief and the taxpayer, only required a nexus between 
the loss and the Estate (which is the taxpayer).182 
The court in Heller, if it decided to use case law under 
§ 165(c)(3), could easily have used an analysis similar to the one 
used in Taghadoss and determined that the Estate and the LLC 
were separate entities. Under that reasoning, with only JHF 
and not the Estate being in privity with Madoff Securities, the 
Estate could have been denied the theft loss. Instead, the only 
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case that the Tax Court did cite under § 165(c)(3) was White.183 
White centered on a diamond that was lost from a ring as a re-
sult of the owner’s hand being slammed in a door.184 The owner 
of the diamond claimed that the loss was an uninsured casualty 
loss under § 165(c)(3).185 The court held that the loss was the 
direct result of an “other casualty” under § 165(c)(3).186 The Heller 
court used this case to determine that all that was needed to 
establish a casualty was a nexus between the loss and the casu-
alty itself.187 In doing so, the Court addressed neither the cases 
under § 165(c)(3) dealing with theft, nor the issue of privity.188 
Instead of appealing the decision in Heller, the IRS let it 
stand. There are several reasons the IRS may have decided not 
to appeal. The first reason is that this decision will not have 
much precedential value as it is a rare occurrence. Section 2054 
was originally adopted in 1954.189 Since Heller was a case of first 
impression, and it occurred sixty-two years after the adoption of 
the statute, the IRS could find that there would not be long-term 
benefits in executing an appeal. Also, the facts in Heller are pe-
culiar. To have precedential value in future interpretations of 
§ 2054, it could be argued that Heller would be limited to a case 
in which there is an estate that owns another entity, such as an 
LLC and when a theft of the assets of the entity occurred be-
tween the time of the death of the owner of the entity and the 
distribution of the entity by the estate. 
Second, the IRS may have assumed that JHF could be seen 
as the equivalent of a conduit to the Estate. This would be easier 
if JHF was 100 percent owned by the Estate, and therefore, a 
disregarded entity for federal taxation purposes.190 In Jensen v. 
Commissioner, Jensen invested in a seafood importing business 
after being approached by a business associate named Howarter.191 
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Howarter brokered the investment for Jensen, instead of Jensen 
dealing directly with the seafood business.192 The business turned 
out to be a Ponzi scheme, and Jensen lost all of his invest-
ment.193 The court held that even though Jensen did not deal 
directly with the business, he could deduct a loss for the theft in 
the transaction.194 This was because the court determined that 
Jensen giving money to Howarter, as many other people did, for 
the sole purpose of investing in the business, established that 
Howarter was acting as a conduit for the business.195 In Heller’s 
case, it could be argued that JHF was set up as a conduit solely 
for the owners to invest in Madoff Securities.196 Upon the death 
of the decedent, JHF became ninety-nine percent owned by the 
Estate.197 If JHF were seen as a conduit, then the Estate would 
have the same privity as JHF itself with Madoff Securities, and 
would therefore be likely to reap the same tax deductions.198 
This argument would be more likely to be successful, however, if 
the Estate owned one hundred percent of JHF. A solely owned 
LLC is considered a disregarded entity for federal income tax 
purposes, meaning that the LLC and the owner are considered 
to be a combined, single entity.199 
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the IRS may be 
afraid that Heller, if confirmed on appeal, would be seen as prec-
edential to weaken the nexus requirement under § 165(c)(3). The 
precedential value of cases under § 165(c)(3) was questioned in 
Goeller,200 using much of the same argument, with the court 
implying that the plain meaning of the statute could allow it to 
be interpreted in ways other than Edwards and its progeny. The 
judge went so far as to call the requirement of using state law a 
shibboleth.201 The further requirement of privity was not tested 
                                                                                                            
192 Id. at 544?45. 
193 Id. 
194 Id. at 546. 
195 Id. 
196 This would be an extension of the brokerage argument in Jensen. See id. 
197 Estate of Heller v. Comm’r, 147 T.C. No. 11, at *1 (2016). 
198 See discussion of Jensen, supra Part III. 
199 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(2) (as amended in 2016). 
200 Goeller v. United States, 109 Fed. Cl. 534, 540 (2013). 
201 Id. 
24 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:001 
in Goeller, but the same analysis that led to the state law re-
quirement could logically be expanded to the privity require-
ment.202 If an appellate court were to affirm the lack of need for 
a direct nexus under § 2054, then the same logic may be applied to 
theft losses under § 165.203 This could allow for a great expansion 
of losses that might be considered thefts, including securities 
frauds where the securities were bought in a brokered trans-
action.204 In Goeller, there was a direct investment between the 
taxpayer and a company called CPR.205 CPR was supposed to buy 
property with the money that was being invested, but some of the 
property was never bought.206 Goeller claimed this was a theft 
and took a deduction for the loss under § 165(c)(3) on his federal 
income taxes.207 The court, in examining Goeller’s claims, ex-
plained that Edwards and its progeny created a shibboleth by 
repeating that to have a theft loss, the theft incurred must meet 
the state law definition in the state where the theft occurred.208 
A shibboleth, the court explained, is something that is repeated 
so often that it becomes accepted as a truth even though it may 
be outmoded.209 Instead of considering the state law requirement as 
axiomatic, the judge examined the legislative history of § 165.210 
Similar to Judge Foley’s examination of the legislative history of 
§ 2054 in Heller, the Goeller court determined that there was noth-
ing compelling the court to rely on anything other than the plain 
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meaning of the statute.211 The court in Goeller then determined 
that the definitions of theft in both Black’s Law Dictionary and 
Webster’s New International Dictionary would suffice, and there 
was no reason to reference the crimes of a particular state to 
define theft.212 Since there is nothing in the legislative history to 
require privity between the person committing a theft and the 
victim (which was not at issue in Goeller), presumably the Goeller 
court would have seen this requirement as a shibboleth as well.213 
The IRS in Heller claimed that under New York law, the theft 
occurred against JHF, not the Estate, and that this breaks the 
privity between the loss and the Estate.214 Because § 165(c)(3) is 
substantially similar to § 2054,215 it would seem that using the 
plain meaning to interpret one would allow for using the plain 
meaning to interpret the other. This may allow for future courts to 
apply a plain meaning reading to § 165(c)(3) and only require a 
nexus between the loss and the taxpayer. This could greatly ex-
pand the types of cases that are brought under § 165(c)(3) for theft 
losses, including cases of securities fraud where there were bro-
kered transactions. Since the IRS has taken the position, and courts 
have agreed since the Edwards case in 1956, that to claim a theft 
there has to be a direct nexus between the taxpayer and the loss, 
this would be a major change.216 To bolster its decision in Heller, 
the court noted that its interpretation is in line with the purpose 
of the estate tax which is “to ensure ‘that the tax is imposed on 
the net estate, which is really what of value passes from the 
dead to the living.’”217 This assumes that the estate’s value is the 
net of what is passed to the estate, less any deduction during the 
administration of the estate, including any theft diminishing 
value of an asset of the estate during the administration, which 
then leaves the remainder passed to the heirs.218 It would seem 
                                                                                                            
211 Id. at 540. 
212 Id. at 542–43. 
213 See Elzweig et al., supra note 108, at 26. 
214 Estate of Heller v. Comm’r, 147 T.C. No. 11, at *2 (2016). 
215 Compare I.R.C. § 165(c)(3) (2012), with I.R.C. § 2054 (2012). 
216 See supra Section II.B.4 for discussion of the privity requirement. 
217 See Heller, 147 T.C. No. 11 at *3 (quoting Jacobs v. Comm’r, 34 B.T.A. 
594, 597 (1936)). 
218 See id. at *2. 
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then that a theft of an asset of an individual would then lower 
the value of that individual’s estate by the amount of the theft in 
that year.219 This could lead the IRS to fear an appeal, which 
may overturn the precedent synonymous with its longstanding 
position regarding theft loss deductions under § 165(c)(3). 
IV.  WHAT IF THE FRAUD HAD BEEN DISCOVERED IN ANOTHER YEAR? 
Currently in income tax cases, the verdicts generally rely 
on the definition of theft used by the courts before them, which 
in turn is based on varying state laws stemming from simpler 
times when tangible property resided in a single state until (and 
perhaps after) it was stolen.220 On the surface, the LLC, as a 
presumably pass-through entity, would be entitled to a theft loss 
under the safe harbor rules and would pass that loss through to 
the estate for income tax purposes.221 However, the LLC’s fraud 
loss might not have been categorized as the estate’s theft loss 
under § 165(c) for income tax purposes, because the plain mean-
ing of § 165(c) is not used.222 Instead, New York state law, which 
requires privity between the fraudster and the victim, might be 
interpreted to mean that the LLC or the estate was not entitled 
to a theft loss, but instead entitled to a capital loss, due to lack 
of privity by both parties.223 The fraud loss would be a deduct-
ible theft loss in determining the taxable estate under § 2054.224 
Thus, we have divergent interpretations of different I.R.C. sec-
tions with very similar wording. 
When Heller died, and how the fraud loss is treated for 
income tax purposes, are material factors in how the family is 
taxed. The effect of Heller’s death immediately before the discov-
ery of the fraud (center row) is contrasted against what would 
have happened had Heller died just one year earlier or later in 
the table below. 
                                                                                                            
219 Id. 
220 Rev. Rul. 72-112, 1972-1 C.B. 60. 
221 See Rev. Proc. 2009-20 § 4.03(4), 2009-14 I.R.B. 749. 
222 For discussion regarding the interpretation of § 165(c), see supra Sec-
tion II.B.1. 
223 See supra Section II.B.4 (the estate did not directly incur the loss, and 
the LLC did not directly invest in the Ponzi scheme). 
224 See I.R.C. § 2054 (2012); Heller, 147 T.C. No. 11 at *2?3. 
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 Income Tax Treatment of $5,175,990 Loss Estate Tax  
Treatment 
 Fraud Loss Is  
Treated as Capital Loss 
Fraud Loss Is  
Treated as Theft Loss 









Heller gets a $3,000 loss in the 
year before death, and $3,000 in the 
year of death. Capital losses for per-
sonal individual income tax returns are 
limited to $3,000 in excess of capital 
gains, if any, for the year. The remain-
ing ($5,175,990 – $3,000) = $5,172,990 
capital loss carryforward to the fol-
lowing year, which is the year of death. 
That carryforward capital loss is again 
limited to $3,000 in excess of capital 
gains, if any, for the year. The remain-
ing ($5,172,990 – $3,000) = $5,169,990 
loss is permanently unused because 
capital loss carryforwards do not 
carry from a living individual to their 
estate at death.225 
Heller takes 
$5,175,990 as a loss 
against current in-
come, possibly creat-
ing an NOL which 
can be carried back 
two years, with any 
excess carried for-
ward to the next year. 
Remaining NOL, if 
any, is permanently 
unused because NOL 
carryforwards do not 
carry from a living 
individual to their es-
















The estate gets a $3,000 loss each 
year that the estate is open, which is 
usually one year. The remaining 
$5,172,990 loss passes through to the 
heirs for their use at the rate of $3,000 
per year in excess of capital gains un-
til the loss is exhausted or the heirs 
die. The unused balance at heirs’ death 
is permanently lost. If Heller’s adult 
heirs were to live fifty years more 
each and have no capital gains, the 
would use (50 x 2 x $3,000) =  $300,000,
leaving $4,872,990 permanently 
unused.228 
The estate takes 
$5,175,990 as a loss 
against current in-
come. Any unused loss 
passes through to the 
heirs to use, possi-
bly creating an NOL 
which can be carried 
back two years with 
any excess carried for-
















The heirs each get a $3,000 per 
year in excess of capital gains until the 
loss is exhausted or the heirs die. The 
unused balance at heirs’ death is 
permanently lost. If Heller’s adult heirs 
were to live fifty years more each and 
have no capital gains, they would use 
(50 x 2 x $3,000) = $300,000, leaving 
$4,875,990 permanently unused.231 
Heirs split the 
$5,175,990 loss against 
current income, pos-
sibly creating an NOL 
which can be carried 
back two years with 
any excess carried for-










                                                                                                            
225 See § 1211(b); id. § 1212(b); I.R.S. Instructions for Schedule D, Cat. No. 
24331I (Oct. 19, 2016). 
226 See I.R.C. § 172(b) (2012). 
227 See Heller, 147 T.C. No. 11 at *3 (interpreting I.R.C. § 2054). 
228 See Treas. Reg. § 1.642(h)-1 (1978). 
229 See § 172(b)(1)(A). 
230 See Heller, 147 T.C. No. 11 at *3 (interpreting I.R.C. § 2054). 
231 See I.R.C. § 1211(b)(1) (2012). 
232 See id. § 172(b)(1)(A). 
233 See Heller, 147 T.C. No. 11 at *3 (interpreting I.R.C. § 2054). 
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Clearly, Heller’s family is unaffected by when the fraud is 
discovered (Column 4) and better off if the plain meaning of theft 
loss is also used for income tax purposes (Column 3 vs. Column 2). 
Heller is worse off for income tax purposes if the fraud is discov-
ered immediately before his death (Row 2 versus Rows 3 and 4). 
For purposes of the current income tax treatment of fraud losses 
only, Heller was better off dead than having lived just long enough 
for the fraud to be uncovered. 
CONCLUSION 
Saved income is taxed once under the income tax struc-
ture when earned, and again, to the extent it is saved, under the 
estate tax structure.234 Both structures allow deductions arising 
from theft. However, there is a difference in courts’ interpreta-
tions as to whether a securities fraud is deductible as a theft 
loss.235 Individuals traditionally have had to show privity be-
tween themselves and the fraudster because theft is traditionally 
defined through state law, which required privity.236 In the case 
of estates, the Tax Court placed reliance on the plain meaning of 
the statute, not the indirect logic of case history, which one 
judge called a shibboleth.237 Indeed, for income tax purposes, the 
plain meaning of theft, and the absence of legislative requirement 
to use state law, may be more compelling than a footnote in a 
single court case, even if that court case is cited repeatedly.238 In 
the meantime, the estate tax interpretation of whether a theft 
loss exists in the case of fraud is more victim-friendly than the 
current, most frequent, income tax interpretation of whether a 
theft loss exists for individuals. As such, for tax purposes, a vic-
tim of fraud, arguably, may be better off dead. 
                                                                                                            
234 See I.R.C. § 2001(a) (2012). 
235 Under the line of cases interpreting I.R.C. § 165(c)(3), a theft loss is only 
deductible for income tax purposes if the state definition of theft is satisfied. 
See supra Section II.B.3–4. However, under Heller, 147 T.C. No. 11 at *3, 
securities fraud would be deductible as a theft loss in the estate tax context. 
236 See Taghadoss v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ. Op. 2008-44, at *3 (2008). 
237 See Heller, 147 T.C. No. 11 at *2; Goeller v. United States, 109 Fed. Cl. 
534, 540 (2013). 
238 See Edwards v. Bromberg, 232 F.2d 107, 111 (5th Cir. 1956). 
